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ABSTRACT. This paper studies the differences in behaviour
of small and large firms, concerning job creation and job
destruction, in the Dutch manufacturing sector over the period
1978–1991. We find that both job creation and job destruc-
tion rates are higher in small firms than in large ones. In
addition, we found that the persistence of jobs created in
slumps are much higher for small firms than for large firms.
Persistence rates of job destruction are, however, less
connected to the state of the business cycle and increase with
firm size. More importantly, small firms seem to reallocate
their jobs in a continuous way, as job turnover moves
independent of the business cycle. Large firms, on the other
hand, reallocate counter-cyclically. An obvious explanation
for this phenomenon is that small firms are better equipped
to adjust to shifts in economic circumstances. Large firms
adjust only slowly and for them reallocating jobs in a reces-
sion is more advantageous than in a boom. 
1.  Introduction 
In the wake of the seminal papers of Leonard
(1987) and Dunne et al. (1989), followed by Davis
and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992) on job creation and
job destruction in the U.S.A., a host of empirical
studies on job flows in other countries have been
issued. See, e.g. Boeri (1994) and Burda and
Wyplosz (1994) for Germany, Contini and Revelli
(1993) for Italy, Blanchflower and Burgess (1994)
and Konings (1995) for the U.K., Albæk and
Sørensen (1994) for Denmark, Klette and
Mathiassen (1994) for Norway.
This paper focuses on the difference in behav-
iour between small and large firms in job creation
and job destruction. Starting with the seminal
paper of Birch (1981), that posited small firms as
the major creators of jobs, there have issued
numerous studies that confirm this finding. The
research of Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) on job
creation and job destruction in the U.S.A. also
shows that job creation and job destruction rates
are higher in small establishments than in large
ones. Blanchflower and Burgess (1994) report the
same fact for the U.K. However, Davis et al.
(1993) warn that there are a number of statistical
pitfalls which lead to an upward bias in job
creation by small firms. This bias arises from
transitory deviations in employment from a firm’s
optimal size. Firms that are only temporarily
below their optimal level are overrepresented in
the lower size classes. One way to correct for this
bias is by defining firm size as an average of two
or more periods.
The Dutch labour market is usually character-
ized as being inflexible. It is believed that tough
laws on dismissal of workers are the main reason
for the fact that job destruction is relatively low.
At the same time, these laws may have prevented
new jobs being created, due to the fear that in bad
times it would be difficult to adjust employment
downwards. This inflexibility hits small firms
more than large firms. Large firms can benefit
from a substantial internal labour market to
destroy unprofitable or redundant jobs and provide
the corresponding worker the opportunity to
occupy another (new or vacant) job in the same
firm. Such a shift in position inside a firm is not
taken into account in most (including our)
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measures of job creation and job destruction.
Small firms do not have a large internal labour
market. Therefore, there is a belief that job
creation and job destruction rates in The
Netherlands are lower than those in countries
with less strict laws. Finally, we will discuss the
implications of our findings for economic theory.
Recent theories on job creation and job destruc-
tion that take account of firm size are those of
White (1982), Brock and Evans (1989), Phillips
and Kirchhoff (1989), Loveman and Sengenberger
(1991) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994).
The main conclusions from our study are the
following. First, firms are very heterogeneous
when different sizes are considered. This,
however, may hardly come as a surprise, as
nowadays it is a well-established fact from labour
market studies using micro-economic data that
there is no such thing as a ‘representative firm’.
Second, in spite of the arguments presented above,
we do find that job creation and job destruction
rates of small firms are considerably higher than
those in large firms. As a consequence, small firms
also have higher job turnover rates than large
firms. Moreover, the timing of job turnover also
differs between small and large firms. If job
turnover is connected to the process of restruc-
turing or reallocation going on in a firm, we find
that large firms tend to restructure their labour
force in periods of economic downturn, whereas
small firms restructure more or less independent
of the state of the business cycle. We also find
that, over the sample, net employment has
increased in small firms, whereas in large firms
employment fell. Particularly interesting is the fact
that the share of small firms in total job creation
is still substantial. Small firms, i.e. with less than
100 employees, account for roughly 50 percent in
total job creation. In case of job destruction, this
share is lower. These features stress the impor-
tance of small firms in the processes of job
creation and employment growth.
Another interesting point that deserves atten-
tion is that the persistence rates of created and
destroyed jobs differs over the business cycle and
with firms size. Persistence rates of jobs created
in an upsurge are more or less the same for firms
of different size; about two-thirds of the jobs
created still exist the next year. However, jobs
created in a downturn are more likely to survive
in small firms than in large ones. In addition, in
all states of the business cycle, we find that the
persistence of destroyed jobs is higher in large
firms than in small ones. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we describe the data and define our measures
of the various job flows. Then, in Section 3 we
give some stylized facts on job creation and job
destruction in The Netherlands. In Section 4, we
elaborate by disaggregating the data. How well our
findings are in line with existing theories is dis-
cussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2.  Data and definitions
All empirical studies of job flows rely on longi-
tudinal plant- or firm-level employment observa-
tions. For The Netherlands, we have two potential
sources. The one used by Hamermesh et al. (1994)
is based on a rich data set of Dutch enterprises in
all sectors. The major drawback of this data base
is that its availability is limited to two years. Our
source is based on firm-level data in the manu-
facturing sector over the period 1978–1991.
Hence, it covers a complete cycle. A disadvantage
is that this set contains no information on other
sectors.
The data we use are provided by the
Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)
and consists of a sample of 3,044 firms observed
over the period 1978–1991. Our data are collected
at the firm-level instead of the establishment-level.
This causes a downward bias to job creation and
destruction, because jobs created and lost by dif-
ferent establishments of the same firm will cancel
out. As a result, our measures of job creation and
destruction underestimate the true magnitude of
job creation and destruction. 
The database contains information about firms
with respect to the number of employees and a
number of other issues. It is based on firms having
more than 10 employees and gives a complete
coverage of all manufacturing firms that fulfil this
criterion. The very small businesses, with less then
10 employees are not taken into account. This is
another reason why our job creation and destruc-
tion measures underestimate the true values.
Finally, we cannot adequately take into account
job creation and destruction due to the entry and
exit of firms. There is attrition in these statistics
212 Lourens Broersma and Pieter Gautier
because of mergers, firms dropping below the
employment threshold, changes in legal status or
location, management buy-outs, etc. Cf. OECD
(1994). Considering continuing firms only leads
to a reduction of some 60 percent in the number
of firms that are included in the statistics in all
14 years. 
We define our measures of job flows accord-
ing to the standard, as set out in Davis and
Haltiwanger (1990). When empe, t is the number of
employees in firm e at time t, then the size of the
firm is defined as 
1
xe, t = 2
(empe, t + empe, t – 1). (1)
Furthermore, the growth rate ge, t of firm e is
defined as
ge, t = 
 
∆empe, t . (2)
xe, t
This differs from the usual definition of a growth
rate where a certain base-year, usually empe, t – 1,
serves as denominator, as in Blanchflower and
Burgess (1994). We use xe, t as denominator to
avoid problems with firms that start operating in
year t for which empe, t – 1 = 0. Moreover, this
definition is less sensitive to the so-called regres-
sion-to-the-mean bias, than the standard definition
with empe, t – 1 as denominator. Cf. Davis et al.
(1993). We will return to this issue later.
Gross job creation in firms of size s at time t
is defined as
The sum of JC and JD is a measure of job real-
location or job turnover between t – 1 and t, so
JRs, t = JCs, t + JDs, t. (6)
Now Xs, t JRs, t measures the change in employment
positions in size class s between t – 1 and t. This
is an upper bound on the number of workers who
switch between employment and non-employment.
A lower bound on the number of workers who
change jobs or employment status in direct
response to job reallocation is measured by
Xs, t MAXs, t, where
MAXs, t = max{JCs, t, JDs, t}. (7)
With these definitions, we can describe and
analyze the job flows. A measure for heterogeneity
among firms can be obtained by taking job
turnover in excess of the absolute value of the net
employment change. This is an indication of the
dispersion of firm growth around the mean of net
employment change, 
EXCs, t = JRs, t – |∆EMPs, t|, (8)
where EMPs, t is the employment in size class s at
time t, which is the sum of the firm-level employ-
ment empe, t over all firms e in size class s. The
absolute net employment change can be inter-
preted as the minimally required amount of job
reallocation. Hence, EXCs, t shows the importance
of simultaneous job creation and destruction
within a certain size class, in other words: the
heterogeneity within such a class.
Finally, the persistence of created and destroyed
jobs is determined as follows. Newly created jobs
at e in t equal empe, t – empe, t – 1. If empe, t + 1 ≥
empe, t, then all of these newly created jobs still
exist in t + 1. If empe, t + 1 ≤ empe, t none of these
jobs is present in t + 1. Next, if empe, t + 1 ∈
[empe, t – 1, empe, t], then empe, t + 1 – empe, t – 1 of the
newly created job are still present in t + 1.
Carrying out this exercise for all growing firms
in t and dividing the result by JC yields the per-
sistence of created jobs, PJC. The persistence of
destroyed jobs, PJD, is calculated analogously.
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e ∈ Es, t , ge, t > 0
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( )∆empe, tXs, t= , (3)
where ∆empe, t < 0,
∆empe, t = empe, t – empe, t – 1, Es, t is the set of firms
of size s at time t and Xs, t is the size of all firms
in size class s,
Xs, t = ∑
e ∈ Es, t
xe, t. (4)
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( )–∆empe, tXs, t= , (5)
where ∆empe, t < 0,
|ge, t|
3.  Stylized facts
Table I summarizes the main statistical character-
istics of the variables introduced in the previous
section for the entire manufacturing sector. We
distinguish job flows due to continuing firms and
due to entry and exit of firms. Manufacturing
employment dropped almost 1 percent in firms
that continuously operated during the whole
sample. JC is dominant to JD, as far as volatility
is concerned. Hence, JC also dominates in JR,
which therefore has an insignificantly positive
correlation with net employment change.
However, casual observation reveals that there
exists an upward trend in JR, caused by an upward
trend in JD and especially in JC. When this trend
is removed, we find a negative correlation, which
is however still insignificant. So for continuing
firms, there seems to be some evidence that real-
location behaves counter-cyclically, although this
evidence is rather weak. 
Job flow statistics contain attrition due to entry
and exit of firms. Apart from the issues mentioned
before, new firms that start from scratch will
usually be very small and may not reach the
threshold of 10 employees. However, a large
proportion of new firms in our panel still consist
of actual firm openings. The same is true for the
exit of firms that stop operating. The OECD
(1994) presents evidence that 70 percent of French
birth and death rates of firms concern the actual
opening and closure of firms. The rest concerns
entries due to a take-over or opening of a sub-
sidiary of an existing firm. For Germany, these
percentages are reported to range between 80 and
90 percent.
Another source for the actual contribution of
entry and exit to job creation and job destruction
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TABLE I
Statistical characteristics of manufacturing job flows in The Netherlands, 1979–1991 (in percentages of employments)
Variable Mean Standard deviationa Maximum Minimum
Continuing firms:
JC 03.62 1.08 (0.81) 05.18 01.74
JD 04.46 0.86 (0.86) 05.81 03.32
JR 08.08 0.84 09.88 06.57
∆EMP –0.84 1.76 01.13 –3.57
EXC 06.63 1.60 09.41 03.49
PJC 56.4 12.2 71.2 41.5
PJD 59.4 9.52 73.7 46.8
Entry/exit:
JC 03.76 0.90 (0.84) 05.74 02.69
JD 03.35 0.91 (0.90) 05.36 02.10
JR 07.10 1.60 11.1 05.15
∆EMP 00.41 0.85 01.53 –1.41
EXC 06.31 1.73 10.7 04.20
All firms:
JC 07.37 1.31 (0.80) 09.35 04.79
JD 07.80 1.59 (1.59) 11.2 05.42
JR 15.2 1.96 19.3 12.7
∆EMP –0.43 2.16 02.60 –3.82
EXC 13.4 2.28 17.3 09.58
Correlations: b, c
Continuing firms ρ(JR, ∆EMP) = 0.28 [0.97] ρ(JRc, ∆EMPc) = –0.10 [0.33]
Entry/exit ρ(JR, ∆EMP) = –0.01 [0.03] ρ(JRc, ∆EMPc) = –0.10 [0.33]
All firms ρ(JR, ∆EMP) = –0.20 [0.68] ρ(JRc, ∆EMPc) = –0.59 [2.42]
a Values after trend removal in parentheses.
b t-values in square brackets.
c Subscript c denotes variables after removing the trend.
is provided by Hamermesh (1991), who approxi-
mates this contribution to roughly one third of
total gross job flows. Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992) find that 25 percent of JC is due to entry
and 20 percent of JD is due to exit. This boils
down to roughly two to five percent of employ-
ment. The OECD (1994) reports figures on job
creation and job destruction due to entry and exit
for German manufacturing of one to two percent
of employment. For France and a number of other
(European) countries these rate range between two
and six percent. In our data set we have no infor-
mation on the actual entry and exit of firms.
However, related survey evidence indicates that
only a limited proportion, of say up to 25 percent
of the reported entry and exit data of Table I, are
the actual opening and closing of a firm. Hence,
the actual entry and exit figures for The
Netherlands are close to those for Germany.
Manufacturing employment due to entry and
exit increased with some 0.4 percent. Note that the
variance in net employment change is rather flat
compared to continuing firms, especially in the
second half of the 1980’s. Further, the variance in
exit slightly dominates the variance in entry, both
with and without trend removal. Hence, JR due
to entry and exit is negatively correlated with net
employment change. 
If job flows in continuing firms and entry and
exit are taken together, we find figures for job
creation and destruction comparable in size with
studies done for a number of other European
countries. Cf. OECD (1987, 1994) and Burda and
Wyplosz (1994). In 1981 JD rose to almost 9
percent, while JC reached a low of 4.7 percent.
Two years later, JD had increased to more than
11 percent, but JC had also increased to some 8
percent, yielding a high of almost 20 percent of
total job reallocation JR. The latter increase in JC
and JD was to some extent due to a high exit and
entry of firms. Total job reallocation started
increasing again at the end of the 1980’s, when
both JC and JD started to rise. When we consider
all firms, the variance in JD clearly dominates that
in JC, especially when the upward trend is
removed. In that case, we find a significant
negative correlation between JR and ∆EMP. This
provides corroborating evidence in favour of many
other studies for a counter-cyclical pattern in job
reallocation. Cf. Davis and Haltiwanger (1990,
1992); Burda and Wyplosz (1994); Konings
(1995).
The OECD (1987) has introduced a measure of
‘normal’ or ‘structural’ job reallocation, defined
as the sum of job creation at the trough of a
recession and job destruction at the peak of an
economic upsurge. Basically, this structural com-
ponent represents the amount of job turnover
occurring in an economy, regardless of the
economic circumstances. We found that for all
firms this structural component was about 12
percent. Hence, 80 percent of total reallocation is
due to structural factors and 20 percent is due to
cyclical factors. When we disaggregate by size
later, we find that this structural component is
slightly higher for large firms. Of course, we
should note that this is a very rough measure of
structural job turnover and caution should be exer-
cised before generalizations are made.
Finally, EXC in Table I shows the importance
of simultaneous job creation and job destruction
in the Dutch manufacturing sector. The excess
reallocation ranges roughly from 10 to 17 percent
of manufacturing employment. A non-zero value
of EXC implies that firms are not homogeneous.
The levels of persistence of created and
destroyed jobs are also presented in Table I for
continuing firms. Over the whole sample, 56
percent of the jobs created in year t still existed
in year t + 1, while almost the 60 percent of jobs
destroyed in year t remain destroyed in t + 1.
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) find values of 67
and 81 percent, respectively, and Konings (1995)
reports 62 and 81 percent, respectively, for large
U.K. firms only.
These values change with the cycle. Of the jobs
created in the period of economic downturn from
1979–1983, only 43 percent still existed a year
later, whereas during the upsurge of 1984–1990,
this was 65 percent. For the persistence of
destroyed jobs these percentages are 65 and 55,
respectively. What can be concluded from these
measures is that not only the level of persistence
is larger in case of job destruction compared to job
creation, but also that the volatility in persistence
of newly created jobs is larger than the persistence
of destroyed jobs. 
Job Creation and Destruction in Dutch Manufacturing 215
4.  Disaggregation by firm size
The size class a firm belongs to is determined by
the number of workers employed by the firm. In
this paper, we distinguish six size classes. Three
categories make up the set of small firms,
according to OECD standards: small firms with
10–19, 20–49 and 50–99 employees. Next, firms
with 100–199 and 200–499 employees make up
the set of medium-sized firms and we finally dis-
tinguish firms with more than 500 employees,
which represent the set of large firms. 
Table II shows the averages of net and gross job
flows by firm size, where we distinguish flows due
to firms that continuously operate during the
whole sample and flows due to entry and exit of
firms. For job flows due to both continuing firms
and entry and exit, we can observe tremendous
heterogeneity. Job reallocation rates decline
sharply with firm size. The very small firms, with
less then 20 employees, have the highest rates of
job creation, but also of job destruction. For
continuing firms, job turnover peaks at almost 12
percent of employment, while for the category of
large firms, with more than 500 employees, it is
only half this value. Medium sized firms have
rates somewhere in between. 
If job creation and job destruction due to entry
and exit of firms is taken into account in Table II,
the share of small firms becomes even more
pronounced. Not surprisingly, almost all new firms
that come into operation are very small in size.
Small firms are, however, also more likely to
close. Research on the distribution of new firms
by size class shows that virtually all entry of
new firms consists of firms with less than 20
216 Lourens Broersma and Pieter Gautier
TABLE II
Average job flow rates of manufacturing firms by different size and correlation with net employment change, 1979–1991
No. of employees (s) JCs JDs JRs ∆EMPs ρ(JRs, ∆EMPs) ρ(JRc, s, ∆EMPc, s)a
Continuing firms
10–19 06.56 05.09 11.7 01.46 00.30 00.30
20–49 06.11 05.41 11.5 00.70 00.65 00.24
50–99 04.97 04.73 09.70 00.24 00.70 00.40
100–199 04.32 04.59 08.91 –0.27 00.26 –0.38
200–499 03.33 04.68 08.01 –1.35 –0.06 –0.21
> 500 02.08 04.17 06.15 –2.09 –0.44 –0.44
10–99 05.37 04.74 10.1 00.63 00.67 00.45
> 100 02.72 04.25 06.98 –1.53 –0.11 –0.34
Entry/exit
10–19b 15.9 10.9 26.8 05.00 –0.01 –0.05
20–49 06.08 04.84 10.9 01.24 00.30 00.33
50–99 04.42 04.59 09.01 –0.17 –0.20 –0.04
100–199 03.82 03.90 07.72 –0.08 –0.66 –0.50
200–499 02.54 03.01 05.55 –0.47 –0.48 –0.38
> 500 01.21 00.83 02.04 00.38 00.30 00.29
10–99 07.51 06.49 14.0 01.02 00.13 –0.01
> 100 01.93 01.81 03.74 00.11 –0.20 –0.06
All firms
10–19b 22.5 16.0 38.5 06.50 00.10 –0.06
20–49 12.2 10.3 22.5 01.90 00.28 –0.14
50–99 09.39 09.32 18.7 00.07 –0.42 –0.27
100–199 08.04 08.49 16.6 –0.35 –0.50 –0.46
200–499 05.87 07.69 13.6 –1.82 –0.54 –0.53
> 500 03.29 05.00 08.29 –1.71 –0.75 –0.74
10–99 12.9 11.2 24.1 00.63 00.33 –0.29
> 100 04.65 06.06 10.7 –1.41 –0.62 –0.68
a Subscript c denotes variables corrected for upward trend.
b Job flows for this category based on 1979–1986 due to break in 1987, correlations based on entire sample.
employees. The OECD (1994) reports that in
Sweden 75 percent of job creation due to entry
was by firms with less than 100 employees. For
the U.K., this was 95 percent. Small firms are also
more likely to exit: 74 percent of the exits in
Sweden were small firms, while this fraction is 83
percent for the U.K. For other countries mentioned
in the study, rates in between those two extremes
were found. For The Netherlands, some 65 percent
of jobs created due to entry, were created by small
firms, whereas 63 percent of jobs disappearing due
to exit, were destroyed by small firms. 
The data show a huge increase in both entry and
exit rates of very small firms (10–19 employees)
in the second half of the 1980’s. In part this may
have to do with the improvement in business
opportunities during that period. It may also reflect
the merger-wave that occurred in The Netherlands
during that period, as argued by De Jong (1988).
The most likely cause, however, is a major change
in the definition of many economic variables in
The Netherlands in 1987. See CBS (1991). On the
other hand, the OECD (1994) reports that the
opening (and closing) of new establishments was
relatively stable in most European countries in the
second half of the 1980’s. We will therefore
consider entry and exit of very small firms only
over the period 1979–1986 and assume that this
is a reasonable representation for 1987–1991 as
well. 
Table II shows that employment in the set of
very small firms, with 10–19 employees increased
substantially. In medium-sized and large firms,
with more than 100 employees, employment
decreased. Note also that the standard deviation of
job creation (not reported) is much larger for small
firms than large ones. Volatility of job destruction
is spread more evenly among firms of different
size. This implies that not only the level of job
creation of small firms is higher, but also that job
creation is a much more important driving variable
in job turnover for small firms than for large ones.
Information on job creation and destruction in
firms with less than 10 employees is not currently
available. There is, however, some information on
the change in the distribution of employment
between firms of different size, including firms
with less than 10 employees. In The Netherlands,
the share of employment in firms with less than
10 employees increased a full percentage point in
1988–1990. The same is true in most European
countries. At the same time, the employment share
of large firms has dropped. Cf. EIM (1994).
When both continuing firms and entry and exit
are taken into account, we find that job turnover
in small firms does not have a clear cyclical
pattern. When a positive trend is removed, the last
column of Table II shows that small firm job
turnover has an insignificant negative correlation
with net employment change. However, if we only
consider continuing firms, small firm job turnover
is positively correlated with net employment
change after the trend is removed. For larger firms
the correlation is negative throughout. Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992) also report a negative corre-
lation between JR and ∆EMP for all firms, but do
not report correlations for firms of different size.
Konings (1995) studies only large firms in the
U.K. and reports a significant negative correlation
between job reallocation and net employment for
that category of firm. 
In continuing firms with up to 100 employees,
the period of economic decline in the early 1980’s
increased job turnover. In the second half of the
1980’s, job turnover in small firms also rose. On
the other hand, in large firms there was high
turnover during the period of recession in the early
1980’s, whereas in the subsequent upsurge the
turnover rate was relatively low. This difference
in job turnover is linked to differences in the rates
of job creation and destruction in the firms of
various sizes. In both large and small firms, the
recession of the early 1980’s increased job
destruction. However, in the subsequent recovery
period, we find a large increase in the rate of job
creation in small firms, whereas job creation in
large firms is only modest in that period. 
In addition to the average job creation and
destruction rates in Table II, Figures 1 to 4 give
the pattern of the various job flows for small firms
with less than 100, and medium and large ones,
with more than 100 employees for 1979–1991.
Figure 1 clearly shows that, apart from the two
recession periods 1981–1983 and 1987, job
creation exceeded job destruction in small firms,
so employment increased. Figure 2 shows that for
large firms, job destruction is in excess of job
creation throughout the whole period, except for
1985–1986 and 1989–1990. Significantly, in the
economic downturn of the early 1980’s job
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destruction rates were almost 5 percentage points
larger than job creation rates. Figure 3 is also
revealing. It shows that job turnover rates in small
firms are twice as large as job turnover rates in
medium-sized and large firms. Note that the
increase in turnover for small firms in 1987 is
probably caused by a change in definition. Finally,
Figure 4 presents the net employment change for
both size categories. In the second half of the
1980’s, employment grew continuously for small
firms, whereas for larger firms this was only the
case for 1985–1986 and 1989–1990.
Even though the results of Table II and the
Figures are interesting, they only tell us that the
contribution of small firms to the process of job
creation and job destruction matters as far as rates
are concerned. This, however, may hardly be
surprising if it is assumed that each firm in each
size category has the same probability of opening
up a new job. Therefore, in Table III, we also
consider the job creation and job destruction
shares in total job creation and destruction for
different size classes. In this case, the contribution
of small firms in total job creation is also quite
substantial. When the entry and exit of firms is
being taken into account, this phenomenon is even
more pronounced. 
Since gross job creation and job destruction
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Fig. 1.  Total job creation and job destruction rates of small
firms (10–100 employees) in The Netherlands, 1979–1991.
Fig. 2.  Total job creation and job destruction rates of larger
firms (> 100 employees) in The Netherlands, 1979–1991.
Fig. 3.  Job turnover rates of small firms (10–100 employees)
and larger firms (> 100 employees) in The Netherlands.
Fig. 4.  Net change in employment in small firms (10–100
employees) and larger firms (> 100 employees) in The
Netherlands.
reflect the dynamic evolution of the size of firms,
we have also computed Markov transition matrices
of firm size. These matrices reflect job creation
and destruction between different size classes.
They denote which fraction of firms of size class
i has moved to higher or lower size classes. These
matrices are reported in Table IV for a period of
economic downturn, 1981–1982, an economic
upsurge, 1989–1990 and for the entire sample
period. Table IV shows that, apart from the firms
in the smallest size class, nearly all firms remain
within the same class, when transitions from one
year to another are considered. Hence, the job
creation and destruction rates presented in Table
II are not affected in a disturbing way by firms
crossing the boundary between different firm
sizes. Only the very small firms have experienced
such growth in employment that in the economic
upsurge of 1989–1990 in The Netherlands, 50
percent moved to a higher size class. However,
note first that we only use the balanced panel to
compute the Markov matrices. Secondly, the small
firms in our data set are based on a representative
sample of all small manufacturing firms. This
implies that the frequency of very small firms,
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TABLE III
Average shares in total job creation and job destruction of
firms of different size (percentages), 1979–1991







> 500 22.8 37.2
10–99 48.4 34.4
> 100 51.6 65.6






> 500 18.6 25.4
10–99 55.9 46.6
> 100 44.1 53.4
TABLE IV
Markov transition matrices of firms size for three different periods
Size class 10–19 20–49 50–99 100–199 200–499 < 500
1981–1982
10–19 90.9 009.1 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0
20–49 01.1 097.2 01.7 00.0 00.0 00.0
50–99 00.0 007.4 89.4 03.2 00.0 00.0
100–199 00.0 000.0 09.4 89.6 01.0 00.0
200–499 00.0 000.0 00.0 08.9 91.1 00.0
> 500 00.0 000.0 00.0 00.0 10.0 90.0
1989–1990
10–19 50.0 050.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0
20–49 00.1 093.2 06.6 00.1 00.0 00.0
50–99 00.8 001.8 92.5 04.9 00.0 00.0
100–199 00.0 000.0 03.2 92.7 03.5 00.0
200–499 00.0 000.0 00.0 03.3 93.9 02.8
> 500 00.0 000.0 00.0 00.0 01.5 98.5
1979–1991
10–19 00.0 100.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0
20–49 02.6 065.4 29.5 02.5 00.0 00.0
50–99 00.7 018.8 57.2 21.4 01.9 00.0
100–199 00.0 003.2 25.0 52.9 18.9 00.0
200–499 00.0 001.2 03.0 25.6 60.7 09.5
> 500 00.0 000.0 00.0 03.9 20.5 75.6
with less than 20 employees, is rather small. This
also accounts for the fact that, in the matrix
covering the entire sample, all firms starting with
less than 20 employees have moved to the next
size class at the end. 
The persistence rates of created and destroyed
jobs in continuing firms of different size is
reported in Table V, where we distinguish between
the persistence rate of the whole sample and the
persistence rate of jobs created and destroyed in
an economic downturn, 1979–1983, and in the
subsequent upsurge, 1984–1990. Over the whole
sample and in both sub-periods, we find that the
persistence in destroyed jobs has the same pattern.
Persistence rises with firm size. Hence, when a job
is destroyed in a large firm, this job remains closed
more often when compared to small firms.
Obviously, the level of persistence for destroyed
jobs is higher in periods of economic downturn.
The persistence rate of newly created jobs is
more interesting. First of all, we find that, over the
whole sample, jobs created in small firms are more
persistent than jobs created in large firms. This is
particularly the case for jobs created in the period
1979–1983; a period of strong economic contrac-
tion. In the recovery period 1984–1990, the per-
sistence rate of newly created jobs is roughly the
same between firms of different size. 
Similar evidence on persistence, as in Table V,
for other countries is limited. Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992) report only aggregate persis-
tence rates of created and destroyed jobs in U.S.
manufacturing establishments. Konings (1995)
finds average values of 62 and 81 percent for firms
with an average employment of roughly 4,500
employees, where the persistence of created jobs
moves pro-cyclically and the persistence of
destroyed jobs moves counter-cyclically. Thus,
comparing these persistence rates with evidence
from other countries is not possible.
5.  Theoretical implications
In the previous sections, we found that small and
large firms exhibited different behaviour in the
creation and destruction of jobs. These differences
are summarized below:
– job turnover in small firms is higher than in
large firms;
– job turnover in small firms takes place over the
entire cycle, whereas in large firms job turnover
has a counter-cyclical pattern;
– in recessions, jobs created in small firms are
more persistent than those created in in large
firms.
There are several explanations for the high rates
of job creation and destruction, and thus job
turnover, in small firms. Some are based on
economic grounds, others have a purely statistical
nature. The latter are regression-to-the-mean bias
(RMB) or the fact that firms cross size borders.
The idea of RMB is that firms which have
experienced temporary bad luck are relatively
overrepresented in the small firm class, while
firms which have had temporary good luck are
relatively overrepresented in the large firm class.
As time goes by, both will return to their normal
levels.
Recently, Davis et al. (1993) have tried to avoid
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TABLE V
Persistence rates for job creation and destruction of continuing firms by firm size (in percentages)
No. of employees PJCs PJDs
1980–1991 1980–1984 1985–1991 1980–1991 1980–1984 1985–1991
10–19 61 55 65 30 36 27
20–49 62 54 68 38 48 31
50–99 60 53 65 48 58 40
100–199 61 51 68 55 64 48
200–499 53 37 65 61 68 56
> 500 50 33 62 74 78 72
10–99 61 54 66 41 50 35
> 100 53 37 64 68 73 64
this regression-to-the-mean bias by re-calculating
the job flows using various measures of job
creation and job destruction. They found this
regression fallacy to be particularly disturbing
when firm size was calculated for one employment
base year. When, instead, our measure was used
or when firm size was calculated on the basis of
average plant size over the whole sample period,
there was no or only a mild version of this regres-
sion fallacy.
Economic explanations for higher job creation
and destruction in small firms are extensively
discussed by the OECD (1994). The entry of new
firms is a major source of job creation and new
firms are usually small in size. However, small
firms not only dominate job creation due to their
entry, but continuing small firms also have higher
job creation rates than large firms. One reason is
the change in socio-economic conditions that
occurred in the early 1970’s. After World War II,
the Western world encountered a period of
economic stability and prosperity. The principle of
economies of scale predicted a tendency towards
large units of production. Diversification strate-
gies led to huge conglomerate corporations. Mass
production predominated the 1960’s and 1970’s
and with it came uniformity of products and
services. 
In the second half of the 1970’s, two severe
recessions hit the Western economies. Uncertainty
increased with high inflation and high interest
rates. At the same time there was a change in
consumer tastes, when the post-World-War-II-
generation matured. Mass-produced products were
out and products reflecting individual tastes and
preferences were in. Large conglomerate corpo-
rations were unable to meet the associated shifts
in demand. Combined with the increase in labour
and capital costs, instigated by the two recessions,
almost every country saw a lot of these corpora-
tions perishing. In contrast, small firms are much
better equipped to deal with shifts in individual
tastes. It is easier for small firms to specialize. In
short: small firms are more flexible and adjust
more smoothly to changes in economic conditions.
Moreover, because of e.g. lower monitoring costs,
wages paid by small firms are lower than wages
paid by large firms in many countries. Cf. Brown
and Medoff (1989). The same is found for The
Netherlands by Oosterbeek and Van Praag (1995).
This means that large firms are more reluctant to
hire a new worker than small firms, since labour
costs are higher for large firms. Other reasons for
small firms to flourish is the cheap availability of
flexibly operating computers, which allow for
quick adjustment to changes. High rates of unem-
ployment from the second part of the 1970’s
onwards may have increased the incentive for
the unemployed to start their own (small) busi-
ness. This is strengthened by the re-evaluation of
the ‘entrepreneurship’ in the past decade and
the improvement in business conditions. See,
e.g., Brock and Evans (1989); Loveman and
Sengenberger (1991).
On the other hand, small (new) firms also have
higher rates of job destruction, mainly because of
higher exit rates. This may have to do with several
specific difficulties that small, new firms
encounter. Mismanagement is one of the major
reasons for new firms to go bankrupt, as Van der
Hoeven and Verhoeven (1994) found for The
Netherlands. New businessmen are in some cases
just not well-prepared to deal with problems
associated with running their own firm. Other
reasons for high job destruction in small firms
include the limited access to information con-
cerning competitors, technology and market
conditions, but also the fact that small firms may
have more financial constraints compared to large
firms, as Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) have pointed
out. Finally, the lower turnover rates of large firms
may also be a sign that they try to resolve
structural changes by means of their internal
labour market. Empirical evidence of Hamermesh
et al. (1994) shows, however, that the importance
of internal labour markets is only minor.
As far as the timing of job reallocation is
concerned, we can distinguish two lines of thought
in the current literature. One sees structural change
as a continuous process. There is a relatively
stable entry of new firms, through which structural
changes are diffused into the economy. Cf.
Baldwin and Gorecki (1990); Boeri and Cramer
(1992) and Boeri (1994). In this view, job creation,
especially among new firms, is the major driving
variable in net employment change.
According to the other view, structural change
takes place mainly in recessions. Recent literature
provides a number of, not mutually exclusive,
theoretical explanations. One line of reasoning
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concentrates on opportunity costs, e.g. Davis and
Haltiwanger (1990); Caballero and Hammour
(1991, 1994); Saint-Paul (1993) and Gautier and
Broersma (1995). The main message is that the
reallocation of labour takes time and effort, which
cannot be used for normal production. Firms will
reallocate in downturns because the opportunity
costs, in the form of foregone production, are
lowest then. Other explanations make use of
adjustment and hiring and firing costs, such as
Nickell (1992) and Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994). They argue that job destruction is con-
centrated in downturns, because fast job creation
is more costly than fast job destruction. In booms
labour markets are tight, which makes it more
difficult to fill newly created jobs and hence
lowers reallocation. This last effect is assumed to
be stronger than the equally plausible effect that
in downturns job destruction is more expensive,
because the flow of voluntary quits is lower. A
third explanation is based on the so-called ‘lame
duck’-effect, as argued by Blanchard and Diamond
(1990). Their idea is that in bad times the fear of
bankruptcy and closure is much more real in
economic downturns than in upswings. Therefore
firms reallocate in an economic downturn. 
We find that for the Dutch manufacturing sector
as a whole, the reallocation of jobs is counter-
cyclical, which supports the second line of
thought. However, when we disaggregate by firms
of different size, we find a dichotomy between
small firms, with roughly less than 100 employees,
and medium-sized and large firms, with more than
100 employees. Small firms tend to reallocate
more or less continuously, independent of the
cycle. This makes them behave in line with the
first stream. Larger firms, on the other hand,
reallocate in a counter-cyclical way, which is in
line with the second view. Large firms probably
have more opportunities to time reallocation
optimally.
Small, new, firms can be characterized as
follows. New firms entering the market are usually
small. Small firms, whether entering or contin-
uing, have better opportunities to adjust more
quickly to changing economic circumstances than
large firms. Cf. Baldwin and Gorecki (1990).
White (1982) shows that small firms are more
important in industries with low capital-labour
ratios, without strong vertical integration, that
have local markets and that sell to other industries.
Small firms appear to be relatively immune to
intensive advertisement in their industry.
Finally, we have to find an explanation for the
fact that the persistence of jobs created in an
economic downturn are more persistent in small
firms than in large firms. Persistence rates of jobs
created in an upsurge hardly differ between the
firms of different size. The persistence of
destroyed jobs is higher in large firms than in
small ones. Regression-to-the-mean bias might
play a role here. Temporary deviations of the
equilibrium size of the firm tend to favour the
persistence rate of created jobs in small firms.
However, we have argued that our measures of job
creation and destruction are not severely effected
by this regression fallacy. It is therefore useful to
consider economic explanations.
We have already seen in Table II that the entry
of new firms largely consists of small firms, with
less that 100 employees. The startup of a new firm
depends on a number of issues. First, on the
personal characteristics of the entrepreneur.
Second, on the extent to which profits from
starting a new firm exceed alternative earnings,
e.g. when working as an employee in an estab-
lished firm. Third, entry may be affected by
retaliation of existing firms, in the sense of
imposing barriers to entry. Cf. Audretsch and Acs
(1994). Skipping the personal characteristics, the
expected profits of starting a new firm depend on
the aggregate growth rate, induced by the macro-
economic environment or the business cycle, but
also on a specific market growth rate, net of the
business cycle. At the same time, in a recession,
unemployment increases and individuals may
compare profits of starting a new firm with unem-
ployment benefits, instead of the reservation wage
mentioned earlier. This also means an increase in
new-firm startups. Finally, it has been argued that
barriers to entry, especially due to economies of
scale in the R&D process, may hamper new-firm
startups. See, e.g. Levin (1978) and Mueller and
Tilton (1969), even though Audretsch and Acs
(1994) find no evidence for this in US startups.
We should hereby note that R&D intensities are
pro-cyclical, so that these barriers are smaller in
downturns. Moreover, R&D intensities in The
Netherlands, are among the lowest in the indus-
trialized world. See Minne (1992).
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All this provides evidence in favour of our
premise that even in an economic downturn, the
number of new-firm startups can be quite sub-
stantial. Such a new startup implicitly means that,
even in a recession, an entrepreneur may still see
ways to exploit the growth possibilities that a
certain market segment offers, e.g. with respect
to tastes, preferences or production techniques.
Another way to describe this feature is to say that
a new firm is at the beginning of its life cycle. In
that situation, a job created in such a new firm is
likely to be more persistent than a job created in
a large, already existing firm in an economic
downturn. So it is likely that the amount of new-
firm startups in the small firm sector in a reces-
sion, accounts for the relatively high persistence
rate of created jobs, compared to the persistence
of jobs created by large firms in a recession.
6.  Concluding remarks
This paper analyses possible relations between the
size of manufacturing firms in The Netherlands
and their behaviour with respect to job creation
and job destruction over the period 1979–1991.
We use a data set based on employment observa-
tions at the firm level. We find that small firms
have higher job creation and job destruction rates.
However, the share of small firms in the total
amount of created jobs in The Netherlands is also
substantial. The contribution of small firms to net
employment change might be overstated because
of several statistical biases, but we have corrected
for that by taking average employment over two
years. There are, however, also good theoretical
reasons for explaining the high rates of job
creation and destruction of small firms. Small
firms may have lower labour costs and lower costs
of adjustment, which enables them to respond
more flexibly to shifts in economic circumstances
than large firms. 
The timing of reallocation also differs between
firms of different size. Job turnover in small firms
is more or less independent of the business cycle,
while large firms reallocate counter-cyclically.
Hence, the process of job losses and gains is more
or less symmetrical as far as small firms are
concerned. For large firms there is asymmetry in
the process of change between job losses and job
gains. Small firms may be capable of rapid adjust-
ment, whereas adjustment in large firms is a
protracted process.
Persistence rates of jobs created and destroyed
also differ between firms of different size and over
the business cycle. The persistence of jobs created
in a period of economic recession decreases
substantially with increasing firm size. The per-
sistence of jobs created in an economic upsurge
hardly differs between firms of different sizes. The
relatively high entry of new, small firms, even in
a period of economic slowdown, explains these
phenomena. The persistence of destroyed jobs
increases with firm size, both in a slump and in a
boom. 
Since small firms have a high contribution to
the process of job creation, but that a lot of jobs
are also lost with small firms, there may be a need
for policy measures to increase the survival of
new, small firms. One could think of stimulating
the emergence of a network local strategic
resources, like business services, access to uni-
versities and centres of technological expertise,
which enable new and small firms to cluster with
other (large) firms and R&D institutions.
Providing a good physical infrastructure and
special assistance in training offered to employees
in small firms and starting businessmen or -women
are also important.
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